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INTRODUCTION 
 
Two of the major, inter-connected debates in the field of microfinance today concern: 1) the 
extent to which microfinance institutions (MFIs) should focus their efforts on reaching self-
sustainability; and 2) the extent to which they should and can provide financial services to 
the poorest of the poor.1  These debates are inter-connected because the poorest of the poor 
are hard for MFIs to reach on a sustainable basis. This is due to their small transaction 
amounts (even relative to those of the poor) and to the fact that their greater need for flexible 
microfinance services makes it more costly to serve them relative to the revenue they 
generate. 
 
These debates take place in the context of an organizational field populated by MFIs whose 
business model requires them to use standardized processes and services to provide financial 
services to the poor.  Standardization is necessary to keep the costs of multiple, small 
transactions to a minimum, because the small amounts involved generate very low revenues 
given that financial services are priced as a percentage of the amount involved.  Thus 
standardization is considered a key to sustainability.2 
 
                                            
1 These services include credit, savings, insurance, and payments or remittances.  The poor 
are those living below the poverty line established by the government of the country in 
which they live, or those living on less than $2 per day (adjusted for purchasing power 
parity) (Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2005).The poorest are those living at less than 50% 
of the poverty line, or those living on less than $1 per day (PPP adjusted) (Microcredit 
Summit Campaign, 2005). 
2 For example, Grameen Bank for about 20 years offered one basic credit product, the 
weekly installment loan through a peer group with a term of one year.  In 2004 it introduced 
Grameen Bank II, which gave borrowers the option of a “flexible loan,” but still kept the 
“basic loan” as its main credit product. (Grameen Bank, 2003) 
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Standardization has two opposed effects on the poorest of the poor.  On the one hand, 
standardization can result in their cross-subsidization because the poorest of the poor receive 
the same service at the same price, even though the cost of providing that service relative to 
the revenue it generates is higher due to the smaller size of their transactions.  On the other 
hand, standardization can result in the exclusion of the poorest because they cannot conform 
to the requirements of the standard, or cannot use the financial service in its standard form 
(Woller 2002, 307-8). 
 
This essay examines the choices facing an MFI wishing to serve the poorest of the poor, as 
well as the less poor (those who are better off than the poorest but still live below the poverty 
line), as a way to maximize its outreach.  It argues that the best option for an MFI seeking to 
reach the poorest of the poor is to create a differentiated set of services to serve them, and to 
seek external, subsidized funding for that activity where necessary.  This argument is 
contingent on the positive climate for the financing of efforts to reach the poorest of the poor 
today, as well as on the MFI being able to solve some internal problems concerning 
organizational capacity, the interests of internal stakeholders, and the migration of existing, 
very poor clients to the new services. 
 
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVISION 
 
Cross-subsidization in the provision of financial services is common.  The provision of 
financial services is such that there is almost always some sort of cross-subsidization going 
on, for the simple reason that almost every client presents a slightly different cost calculus to 
the organization and the cost of differentiating among clients is high.  The most common 
form of cross-subsidization is from clients transacting in large sums of money, on the one 
hand, to clients transacting in small sums of money, on the other hand, where the basic 
nature of the service is the same and the price charged is a percentage of the amount of the 
transaction.  The cost of providing the service on each transaction is the same, but the 
revenue earned varies, with more income being earned from the larger sums.  As a result, a 
financial institution will earn excess profits on the larger-than-average transactions and 
below-normal profits on the smaller-than-average transactions.  Financial institutions do 
differentiate among their customers according to transaction size, for example by paying a 
higher interest rate on larger savings deposits, but the differentiation involves large 
categories of customers, within which there is enough variation to generate cross-
subsidization.   
 
Financial institutions face the same situation with borrower risk.  In a perfect world each 
borrower would be charged a price (interest rate) on their loan based on their risk of 
delinquency and default.  But such a differentiation among borrowers is prohibitively costly.  
As a result, financial institutions pool borrowers into broad risk categories that include 
borrowers whose likelihood of delinquency and default are significantly different from each 
other.  Unlike in the case of loan size differentiation, it may be the case that the less risky 
borrowers are still better off in this “broad risk category” situation than they would be in a 
risk-differentiation situation. After all, the costs of risk differentiation may be sufficiently 
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high that, when the lender passes them on to the borrower through fees and interest charges, 
the cost of the loan is higher than it would have been in the “broad risk category” situation. 
 
Cross-subsidization is more likely in microfinance where the premium is on keeping 
transaction costs low through standardization.  MFIs offer customers with a wide variety of 
transaction sizes and risk profiles the same service at the same price.  Furthermore, because 
MFIs often operate as monopolies with little competition, they have not faced competitive 
pressures to differentiate their services to retain their best customers. 
 
This cross-subsidization takes place within a large, but limited customer base – the poor.  
Through their pricing, geographical targeting, and service delivery methodologies, MFIs 
make their services unattractive to middle-income and wealthy individuals.  As a result, any 
cross-subsidization within the organization’s customer base flows between groups that are 
poor.   
 
The implications of this for the poorest of the poor are ambiguous.  Those that are able to 
gain access to the services of an MFI also gain access to the cross-subsidy.  But 
standardization makes it difficult for the poorest to gain access to MFI services, because the 
standard service does not meet their needs.  This exclusionary impact can be exacerbated 
through policies such as paying front-line employees on the basis of commission as a 
percentage of the transaction amount – the poorest have smaller transactions and employees 
can discourage them from using the MFI’s services – or requiring membership in a peer 
group to gain access to a standardized loan service – the poorest may be less able to form 
such groups (Woller 2002, 307-8; Rutherford 2004; but also see Stuart 2006 for a contrary 
view of group formation among the poorest based on Indian caste data).   
 
The result is a situation with the following characteristics: some of the poorest gain access to 
cross-subsidized services, while others are excluded; and, the less poor are the ones who end 
up subsidizing the poorest.  Is this situation satisfactory?  If the aim is to maximize the 
outreach of the MFI then it is far from satisfactory.  The MFI is limiting its outreach to the 
poorest to those who are able to make use of the standard services.  And the less poor are 
being charged a higher price for the standard services than they would otherwise be, because 
they are cross-subsidizing the poorest.  So even if the aim of the MFI is to increase its 
outreach to the less poor, this strategy is only partially successful assuming a downward-
sloping demand curve. 
 
SERVICE DIFFERENTIATION AND EXTERNAL SUBSIDIES 
 
One way to solve this problem is through service differentiation.  The contention is that 
services that differentiate between the less poor and the poorest serve two purposes.  First, 
such differentiation creates services that are suitable to the poorest, thus increasing the 
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outreach of an MFI to them.3  Second, it makes explicit the process of cross-subsidization in 
two ways: 1) the creation of the new service(s) will require expenditures of an MFI for the 
specific, explicit purpose of serving the poorest; 2) if the differentiation results in the 
migration of the poorest who are currently served by the standard services to the new 
services, then there will be a decrease (possibly to zero) in the number of people being 
subsidized through the standard services.   
 
If the service differentiation strategy succeeds, then an MFI will be serving the less poor 
with one set of (standard) services and the poorest with another.  As a result, an MFI may 
choose to lower the price of the standard service, thus increasing the attractiveness of the 
standard service to the less poor, increasing outreach in that market segment, and preparing 
the MFI for any future competition it may face in that market segment (McIntosh et al. 2005, 
285).  But this option can only work if an MFI can break even on the new services targeted 
at the poorest, and it is unclear that this is possible, especially if large-scale outreach is a 
goal.   
 
Alternatively, an MFI can keep the pricing of standard services the same. This will result in 
an increase in profits from them, which an MFI can then choose to use to subsidize the 
poorest.  This puts us back to where we were before, with the poor subsidizing the poorest, 
but at least now the subsidy is more explicit and the poorest have more access to financial 
services through the new services.  The danger here is that the more explicit nature of the 
subsidy makes it more vulnerable to criticism from within the organization.  Furthermore, if 
the new services result in a higher percentage of the poorest gaining access to services, then 
the total amount of the subsidy will grow, putting a financial strain on the MFI as a whole. 
 
In this context, outside funding to subsidize the services to the poorest make sense.  An MFI 
can market a set of differentiated services, targeted at the poorest, to providers of funds 
based on the fact that there is a specific target population that they believe is worth reaching.  
Furthermore, the very weakness of the differentiated service approach to serving the poorest 
in terms of gaining internal support – the explicit nature of the subsidy going to the poorest, 
is a strength in attracting external funding.  The more clearly an MFI is able to articulate the 
size of the subsidy needed to serve the poorest, the better for fundraising purposes. 
 
There are, however, some problems with this strategy: two related to the decision to 
differentiate and two concerned with the decision to seek external funding.  First, given the 
MFIs’ traditional strategy of standardization, is differentiation going to be disruptive to the 
operations of an organization that adopts it?  Standardization keeps things simple; 
differentiation not only requires an MFI to move down the cost curve on a new set of 
services, but also to do so without disrupting the operations of the organization with respect 
to its standard services.  An MFI deciding to adopt a service differentiation strategy as a way 
to reach the poorest of the poor must be willing and able to install the organizational capacity 
that will allow it to offer a wide variety of services to different, targeted markets. 
                                            
3 It should be noted that I am not only thinking of credit services for the poorest.  In fact, it 
may be the case that the first need of the poorest lies in more flexible savings or insurance 
services. 
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There is also a concern that the migration of the existing poorest clients to the differentiated 
service will not take place.  As a result, an MFI may end up in a situation in which it has a 
service designed for the poorest that attracts a new set of clients, while the existing poorest 
clients continue to use the standard services at a cross-subsidized rate.  An MFI can 
encourage a migration by increasing the difficulty for the poorest to gain access to the 
standard service.  Or it can encourage migration by actively marketing the new services to 
the existing clients.  
 
With respect to external funding, an MFI has to be willing and able to access external 
funding.  Even if an MFI wishes to expand its outreach by serving the poorest of the poor, as 
we are assuming here, there may be limits as to how far it is willing or able to go.  A 
member-owned organization that prides itself on its independence may be unwilling to 
sacrifice that independence for the sake of further outreach, and may decide that internal 
cross-subsidization is a better option.  On the other hand, a for-profit entity with a double 
bottom-line strategy or a non-profit organization may see differentiation plus external 
subsidies as a way to increase outreach without burdening the less poor.   
 
In terms of the ability to raise external funds, MFIs are likely to have some experience, so 
this is less likely to be a problem.  What is likely to be a problem is the question as to 
whether support of external fund providers can be sustained in the long run.  At the time of 
writing, there is considerable support in the funding community for efforts to reach the 
poorest of the poor.  An MFI that adopts the strategy of differentiation and external subsidies 
will have to ensure that this support continues. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
An MFI seeking to increase its outreach to the poorest of the poor, while maintaining its 
ability to serve the less poor, should consider a strategy of service differentiation supported 
by external subsidies.  Service differentiation will enable an MFI to reach more effectively 
both the poorest of the poor and the less poor, while also preparing the MFI for any potential, 
future competition in the less poor market segment.  But service differentiation is costly, and 
makes explicit the subsidy inherent in a standardized service delivery system.  As such, it 
raises the question as to who should pay to subsidize the poor.  If it is not external providers 
of funds, then it will be the less poor.  The argument here is that the former are a better 
option. 
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